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DIFFERENCES IN THE PRIVATE COST OF HEALTH CARE 
BETWEEN PROVIDERS AND SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES: 
RESULTS FOR SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES 
 
Clarence Tsimpo and Quentin Wodon 
The World Bank 
 
The issue of whether faith-inspired providers are able to reach the poor depends 
in part on the cost of the health services provided. This paper relies on recent 
nationally representative household surveys for sub-Saharan African countries to 
assess to what extent the cost of healthcare is a major reason for not being 
satisfied with health services and whether concerns with costs differ between 
types of providers. The paper also provides estimates of the cost of healthcare in 
a half dozen countries, again comparing public, private secular, and faith-
inspired providers. The results suggest that cost indeed remains a major concern 
for households. There are differences in out-of-pocket costs for households 
between providers, with in many cases public providers being cheaper than faith-
inspired providers and private secular providers. Yet these differences depend on 
the country and are not as large as one might have assumed. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Whether faith-inspired providers are able to reach the poor depends in part on the cost of 
the health services that they provided. It is often believed that faith-inspired providers in 
Africa do reach the poor in part because they make special efforts to make their services 
affordable to them at low cost. This concern for the poor and the affordability of care is 
itself related to the fact that Africa’s two leading religions, Christianity and Islam, both 
have longstanding traditions of service to the poor, including in the area of healthcare.  
 
There is some evidence that faith-inspired health facilities have altruistic motives, or at 
least do not behave in the way that for-profit health providers would, and this has 
implications for cost recovery of the services provided. In their analysis of health service 
provision in Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson (2010) used a change in financing of not-
for-profit health care providers through untied grants to test two theories of 
organizational behavior. The first theory postulates that not-for-profit providers are 
intrinsically motivated to serve the poor and will therefore use new resources to expand 
their services or cut the cost of these services. The second theory postulates that not-for-
profit providers are captured by their managers or workers and behave like for-profit 
actors. Although they may not appropriate profits, they would tend to use untied grants to 
raise the salaries of their staff or provide them with other benefits that would not directly 
serve the poor. The authors’ empirical results suggest that the first altruistic theory is 
validated by the data, and that the results matter in the sense that this altruistic difference 
makes a difference for the poor. Specifically, the authors were able to show that untied 
grants made to small faith-inspired facilities were used to increase services and reduce 
costs for patients, as opposed to increasing benefits for staff. 
2 
 
 
Yet as this example also implicitly suggests, the extent to which faith-inspired health 
providers are able to make their services affordable for the poor depends on their funding 
and other resources in comparison to those of other providers. In order to be able to 
provide quality services at low cost to the poor, faith-inspired providers must benefit 
from appropriate resources, for example through support from congregations, whether 
these are locally based or located in developed countries, or from other organizations 
including government agencies. In the absence of such support, subsidies granted to the 
poor may require charging better off patients more for the services provided to those 
groups, or relying on staffs that are willing to work at below market wages.   
 
Different strategies for reducing the cost of services for the poor may not have the same 
medium- or long-term consequences. For example, relying on staffs who are willing to 
work at below market wages (as may be the case for nuns for example), or on resources 
made available by external groups may not carry a risk in terms of financial sustainability 
as long as the staffs are willing to continue to work for low wages or as long as external 
funders are willing to continue to provide resources in order to make services more 
affordable for the poor. By contrast, differentiated subsidies for the poor paid for by 
asking higher fees from other groups – what could be referred to as a Robin Hood 
strategy - might not be sustainable under competitive markets. Indeed, under competitive 
markets, subsidies for the poor would lead not only to poor patients or students relying on 
faith-inspired facilities as compared to other facilities, but also to fewer non-poor patients 
or students, which would ultimately be unsustainable in the absence of other funding or 
cost reduction mechanisms, such as those mentioned earlier.  It might be feasible under 
different types of markets to charge more to the better off in order to subsidize the poor – 
for example, under a segmented market with quality differentiated among others 
according to faith, better off households who value the faith affiliation of a clinic may be 
willing to pay more at that clinic than at another clinic, which may then make it feasible 
for a facility to subsidize the services provided to the poor. Yet it is not clear how much 
resources might be generated through price differentiation for such purposes. 
 
In this paper, we do not discuss specifically how faith-inspired facilities may be able to 
male their services affordable for the poor, whether this is done through cross-
subsidization or through access to resources from congregations and other donors (for a 
case study on this question, see Gemignani et al 2012; see also more generally Wodon 
2013). Instead, and more simply, we first assess in section 2 to what extent the cost of 
healthcare remains a major reason for not being satisfied with the health services received 
by households and whether concerns with costs differ between different types of 
providers. Thereafter, we estimate in section 3 the private cost of healthcare in a half 
dozen countries and compare out-of-pocket costs between public, private secular, and 
faith-inspired providers. Finally, we provide a brief country case study in section 4 on 
how health sector reforms may help in providing more equity in the financing of health 
facilities and reduce out-of-pocket costs for households. A brief conclusion follows.  
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IMPORTANCE OF COSTS FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Is the private out-of-pocket cost of healthcare a major issue for households? In order to 
answer this question, we build on the analysis of patient satisfaction with faith-inspired 
and other service providers presented in Volume two of this series by Olivier and Wodon 
(2012). The results presented in that chapter suggested that satisfaction with the services 
provided by faith-inspired providers was higher than with those provided by public 
facilities. Using the same data, this section shows that one of the main reasons for non-
satisfaction with the services received among households is related to the cost for 
households of the services. Yet at the same time, there are also substantial differences 
between countries, with cost being more of an issue in some of the poorest countries.   
 
The analysis is provided in tables 1 through 5 for five countries where the data are 
available through specific questions in the survey questionnaires. In the tables, the first 
line accounts for the share of households who were satisfied with the services received. 
The other lines represent the main reasons for not being satisfied. The responses 
(satisfaction and reasons for non-satisfaction) sum to 100 percent within each group (i.e., 
national, urban-rural, and quintiles of well-being) as well as for the various providers.  
 
In all countries, the fact that the cost of service was perceived as too expensive is the 
main reason for lack of satisfaction. Cost is mentioned as an issue for 37.9 percent of 
patients in Burundi (the poorest country in the sample), 18.0 percent in Senegal, 13.1 
percent in Mali, 11.4 percent of patients in Ghana, and 10.4 percent in the Republic of 
Congo (the richest country in the sample). In Mali and Burundi (the two poorest countries 
ion the sample) but not in the other three countries, cost is also mentioned more by 
households in the bottom quintiles of well-being, which does makes sense.  
 
What is also interesting is the fact that in four of the five countries, cost is actually 
mentioned as being less of an issue for faith-inspired facilities than for public facilities. In 
the Republic of Congo, 14.6 percent of patients in public facilities declare that cost is an 
issue, versus 6.5 percent in faith-inspired facilities. In Burundi, the two corresponding 
figures are 37.9 percent for public facilities, versus 30.6 percent for faith-inspired 
facilities. In Mali, the comparison is 16.9 percent to 6.0 percent. Finally in Senegal 19.6 
percent of users of public facilities complain about cost, versus only 2.9 percent in faith-
inspired facilities. For Ghana by contrast, the proportion of users who complain about 
cost is similar in both types of facilities (it is actually slightly higher in faith-inspired 
facilities at 14.4 percent versus 13.2 percent in public facilities), but this is also the 
country where there are no substantial differences in overall satisfaction rates between 
public and faith-inspired providers. Note that in three of the five countries, complaints 
about cost were higher in other private facilities than in the faith-inspired sub-sector. The 
comparison with private facilities is however more complex because many households 
going to private facilities may have formal insurance that reduce out of pocket costs. 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
Table 1: Satisfaction rates and reasons for non-satisfaction in Burundi (%) 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile Total 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Public  None (satisfied) 46.6 37.8 36.8 35.5 37.5 35.1 44.0 38.0 
Facilities were not clean 0.6* 1.6 0.6* 0.7* 0.6* 2.2 3.1 1.6 
Long waiting time 6.7* 11.9 10.8 10.0 11.5 14.7 11.4 11.8 
No trained professionals 2.3* 1.3 1.1* 2.0* 1.1* 1.0* 1.7* 1.4 
Too expensive 35.1 38.0 41.3 40.6 37.9 39.7 31.6 37.9 
No drugs available 2.2* 3.3 3.7 3.7 4.2 3.3 1.9 3.3 
Treatment unsuccessful 1.1* 4.5 5.0 4.8 4.5 3.1 4.7 4.4 
Prison 1.9* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 0.1* 
Other 3.5* 1.6 0.6* 2.7 2.7 0.9* 1.5 1.7 
 
Faith-inspired  None (satisfied) 47.4 43.1 46.6 43.7 34.6 48.1 42.6 43.2 
Facilities were not clean 0.0* 0.6* 0.0* 0.0* 0.6* 1.7* 0.5* 0.6* 
Long waiting time 7.1* 17.0 18.5 18.4 17.1 10.8* 18.9 16.7 
No trained professionals 0.0* 0.5* 0.0* 0.0* 1.9* 0.5* 0.0* 0.5* 
Too expensive 38.4 30.3 29.0 30.7 39.2 32.7 21.7 30.6 
No drugs available 2.7* 2.6 1.8* 3.1* 2.2* 2.8* 3.2* 2.6 
Treatment unsuccessful 1.3* 4.8 2.7* 3.9* 2.5* 1.9* 12.1* 4.7 
Prison - - - - - - - - 
Other 3.1* 1.1* 1.4* 0.4* 1.8* 1.5* 1.0* 1.2* 
 
Private secular  None (satisfied) 47.7 39.3 34.9 41.8 43.3 35.9 43.2 40.0 
Facilities were not clean 0.0* 2.4 1.1* 1.5* 0.8* 5.9* 0.9* 2.2 
Long waiting time 2.2* 7.7 10.9* 5.4* 5.6* 8.1 6.6 7.3 
No trained professionals 0.5* 1.1* 3.9* 1.0* 1.0* 0.0* 0.2* 1.0* 
Too expensive 41.6 42.6 39.2 47.1 42.1 42.9 42.0 42.5 
No drugs available 3.4* 2.0 2.5* 1.3* 2.2* 2.6* 1.8* 2.1 
Treatment unsuccessful 1.9* 3.7 5.7* 0.7* 3.5* 3.3* 4.0* 3.5 
Prison - - - - - - - - 
Other 2.7* 1.3* 1.9* 1.1* 1.5* 1.2* 1.3* 1.4* 
 
All users  None (satisfied) 47.3 38.6 37.6 37.6 38.3 36.7 43.7 39.0 
Facilities were not clean 0.3* 1.7 0.7* 0.7* 0.8* 2.9 2.6 1.7 
Long waiting time 4.8 11.8 11.8 10.4 10.9 13.0 11.1 11.5 
No trained professionals 1.5* 1.2 1.5* 1.5* 1.2* 0.7* 1.3 1.2 
Too expensive 38.1 37.9 39.4 40.3 38.9 39.5 32.6 37.9 
No drugs available 2.8* 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.1 2.0 3.0 
Treatment unsuccessful 1.5* 4.3 4.9 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.3 4.2 
Prison 0.9* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 0.0* 
Other 3.1* 1.5 1.0* 2.1 2.4 1.0* 1.4 1.6 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
Note: * indicates less than 20 observations – these cells are likely not to be reliable but provided for 
completeness. 
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Table 2: Satisfaction rates and reasons for non-Satisfaction in Ghana, 2003 (%) 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile Total 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Public  None (satisfied) 73.4 73.2 70.6 75.7 75.0 73.0 72.1 73.3 
Facilities were not clean 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.9 
Long waiting time 8.3 5.7 5.8 5.6 6.2 7.9 8.0 6.8 
No trained professionals 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Too expensive 13.8 12.8 13.1 12.4 11.8 13.7 14.6 13.2 
No drugs available 7.0 5.7 7.1 5.3 5.6 5.9 7.3 6.3 
Treatment unsuccessful 5.6 8.5 10.1 6.8 6.7 5.9 7.3 7.2 
Poor staffing attitude 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.2 
Other 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 
 
Faith-inspired  None (satisfied) 73.1 72.9 67.2 76.0 74.3 73.0 74.4 72.9 
Facilities were not clean 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Long waiting time 6.1 6.0 8.1 3.6 5.3 3.6 9.0 6.0 
No trained professionals 1.3 1.6 0.7 2.1 1.2 2.9 0.7 1.5 
Too expensive 17.6 13.1 17.3 12.0 14.9 14.0 13.4 14.4 
No drugs available 3.9 3.9 4.3 2.5 3.0 4.6 4.9 3.9 
Treatment unsuccessful 6.3 8.4 10.6 8.5 7.1 9.2 4.0 7.9 
Poor staffing attitude 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.5 3.1 1.0 1.4 1.9 
Other 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 
 
Private secular  None (satisfied) 83.2 83.8 83.2 85.7 84.3 82.5 82.3 83.5 
Facilities were not clean 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Long waiting time 2.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.1 1.3 
No trained professionals 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Too expensive 11.9 8.1 7.6 7.5 9.1 11.4 11.6 9.7 
No drugs available 3.6 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 3.9 3.6 3.0 
Treatment unsuccessful 3.2 7.0 8.3 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.4 5.4 
Poor staffing attitude 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Other 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
 
All users  None (satisfied) 78.5 78.9 77.2 81.0 79.9 78.0 77.8 78.7 
Facilities were not clean 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Long waiting time 4.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.4 4.4 4.8 3.9 
No trained professionals 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Too expensive 12.9 10.3 10.4 9.8 10.5 12.5 12.9 11.4 
No drugs available 5.1 3.9 4.5 3.4 3.9 4.8 5.2 4.4 
Treatment unsuccessful 4.3 7.7 9.2 6.3 5.9 5.3 5.6 6.3 
Poor staffing attitude 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.4 
Other 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
Note: * indicates less than 20 observations – these cells are likely not to be reliable but provided for 
completeness. 
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Table 3: Satisfaction rates and reasons for non-satisfaction in Senegal (%) 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile Total 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Public  None (satisfied) 71.1 57.8 67.1 65.8 58.5 63.2 65.9 64.0 
Staff not welcoming 2.1 2.9 1.5 1.1 3.6 3.2 2.5 2.5 
Facilities were not clean 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 
Long waiting time 9.2 16.3 8.0 8.8 15.7 14.9 14.7 12.9 
No trained professionals 2.2 4.5 2.5 2.1 4.9 4.5 2.7 3.4 
Too expensive 12.6 25.7 17.0 16.3 23.8 21.7 18.0 19.6 
No drugs available 4.5 6.8 3.2 5.1 6.5 6.7 6.1 5.7 
Treatment unsuccessful 3.2 9.6 8.6 8.4 6.6 6.8 4.2 6.6 
Other 1.3 10.3 3.7 4.9 5.8 7.6 7.0 6.1 
 
Faith-inspired  None (satisfied) 86.9 86.6 92.8 86.2 79.3 85.9 90.9 86.8 
Staff not welcoming 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Facilities were not clean 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 1.2 
Long waiting time 4.8 5.2 3.7 3.6 10.7 5.2 0.0 5.0 
No trained professionals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Too expensive 1.8 3.9 1.4 0.4 8.5 2.7 0.0 2.9 
No drugs available 3.8 4.0 1.4 4.0 0.0 8.2 1.0 3.9 
Treatment unsuccessful 0.0 2.9 2.4 6.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Other 1.5 1.2 2.4 0.4 0.6 1.9 0.0 1.3 
 
Private secular  None (satisfied) 71.9 66.1 66.7 64.1 65.4 70.9 74.0 69.2 
Staff not welcoming 2.9 1.0 0.6 0.7 2.0 3.6 2.4 2.0 
Facilities were not clean 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Long waiting time 7.1 5.1 5.1 6.6 5.4 5.4 7.3 6.1 
No trained professionals 0.9 3.9 1.8 2.5 5.2 1.8 1.2 2.3 
Too expensive 15.3 16.9 14.7 18.7 16.9 15.7 15.4 16.1 
No drugs available 2.5 5.3 4.7 6.5 3.7 2.6 2.7 3.8 
Treatment unsuccessful 4.7 10.4 11.7 9.5 6.6 5.8 5.4 7.4 
Other 1.2 7.0 5.3 5.7 5.9 3.5 1.5 3.9 
 
All users  None (satisfied) 71.8 61.0 67.7 65.6 61.0 66.3 69.2 66.2 
Staff not welcoming 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.0 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.3 
Facilities were not clean 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.0 
Long waiting time 8.3 12.6 6.9 8.0 12.6 11.8 11.8 10.5 
No trained professionals 1.7 4.2 2.2 2.1 4.9 3.6 2.1 3.0 
Too expensive 13.3 22.5 15.8 16.8 21.5 19.2 16.8 18.0 
No drugs available 3.7 6.3 3.7 5.5 5.5 5.6 4.8 5.0 
Treatment unsuccessful 3.7 9.7 9.6 8.7 6.4 6.3 4.6 6.8 
Other 1.2 9.1 4.3 5.1 5.7 6.2 4.9 5.3 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
Note: * indicates less than 20 observations – these cells are likely not to be reliable but provided for 
completeness. 
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Table 4: Satisfaction Rates and Reasons for non-Satisfaction in Rep. of Congo (%) 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile Total 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Public  None (satisfied) 68.0 62.1 69.6 68.0 60.6 63.3 67.3 65.7 
Staff not welcoming 6.5 14.4 11.0 11.6 7.9 9.6 8.9 9.7 
Long waiting time 13.2 19.2 14.8 11.8 22.8 17.1 11.5 15.6 
No trained professionals 0.5 3.3 4.4 0.4 1.7 1.8 0.3 1.7 
Too expensive 15.0 13.9 12.0 10.7 19.2 12.9 17.1 14.6 
No drugs available 9.0 13.4 12.9 9.3 15.5 7.4 9.0 10.8 
Treatment unsuccessful 3.9 8.6 9.8 5.9 4.7 4.9 4.4 5.8 
Other 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.1 0.8 3.1 0.9 1.4 
 
Faith-inspired  None (satisfied) 89.5 91.3 80.6 100.0* 79.2* 89.4* 100.0* 90.0 
Staff not welcoming 0.0 4.2 3.3 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 1.1 
Long waiting time 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 10.6* 0.0* 2.4 
No trained professionals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
Too expensive 8.7 0.0 8.3 0.0* 20.8* 10.6* 0.0* 6.5 
No drugs available 3.7 4.2 7.5 0.0* 20.8* 0.0* 0.0* 3.8 
Treatment unsuccessful 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
Other 1.8 4.6 7.8 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 2.5 
 
Private secular  None (satisfied) 87.1 85.7 85.4 83.8 88.4 87.7 86.8 86.5 
Staff not welcoming 1.7 1.6 0.5 3.7 0.8 0.3 2.9 1.7 
Long waiting time 1.4 2.6 0.0 2.0 0.8 2.4 3.9 1.9 
No trained professionals 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 
Too expensive 6.9 6.9 9.1 3.8 6.9 7.5 6.8 6.9 
No drugs available 2.8 2.8 3.5 5.2 3.3 1.6 1.3 2.8 
Treatment unsuccessful 2.8 5.8 4.9 5.2 4.6 3.1 3.2 4.1 
Other 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.6 
 
All users  None (satisfied) 78.4 75.5 78.3 77.1 74.6 77.1 78.5 77.2 
Staff not welcoming 3.9 7.3 5.2 7.2 4.3 4.4 5.5 5.3 
Long waiting time 7.0 9.9 6.4 6.4 11.6 9.2 7.2 8.2 
No trained professionals 0.3 1.7 1.9 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.2 0.8 
Too expensive 10.7 9.8 10.3 6.8 13.1 10.0 11.2 10.4 
No drugs available 5.7 7.5 7.8 6.9 9.5 4.1 4.7 6.5 
Treatment unsuccessful 3.2 6.9 6.7 5.3 4.6 3.8 3.7 4.7 
Other 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.4 1.6 0.6 1.0 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
Note: * indicates less than 20 observations – these cells are likely not to be reliable but provided for 
completeness. 
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Table 5: Satisfaction rates and reasons for non-Satisfaction in Mali (%) 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile Total 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Public  None (satisfied) 67.7 60.8 55.1 63.5 60.4 65.9 67.3 63.7 
Facilities were not clean 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.3 
Long waiting time 17.8 7.7 14.9 9.5 8.1 10.5 16.5 11.9 
No trained professionals 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.0 2.5 2.8 1.1 2.2 
Too expensive 9.6 22.1 24.7 22.1 23.6 13.9 8.7 16.9 
No drugs available 6.1 7.7 9.0 5.1 6.4 9.2 5.7 7.0 
Treatment unsuccessful 5.2 9.2 14.4 8.9 9.6 5.5 4.6 7.5 
Staff not welcoming 3.3 1.1 2.2 2.0 1.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Other 0.4 2.2 0.2 1.3 3.2 2.2 0.0 1.4 
 
Faith-inspired  None (satisfied) 45.6* 85.0 53.6* 100.0* 100.0* 85.2* 0.0* 78.7 
Facilities were not clean 0.0* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
Long waiting time 9.7* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 55.8* 1.5 
No trained professionals 0.0* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
Too expensive 37.1* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 14.8* 0.0* 6.0 
No drugs available 0.0* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
Treatment unsuccessful 0.0* 15.0 46.4* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 12.6 
Staff not welcoming 7.6* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 44.2* 1.2 
Other 0.0* 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0 
 
Private secular  None (satisfied) 75.6 78.7 84.2 82.0 76.7 66.8 76.7 77.2 
Facilities were not clean 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 
Long waiting time 15.3 4.9 2.3 2.1 7.0 19.0 15.1 9.9 
No trained professionals 0.1 2.0 2.3 0.7 2.1 1.0 0.0 1.1 
Too expensive 3.0 5.6 3.3 6.4 5.5 6.1 2.2 4.3 
No drugs available 0.3 4.2 3.2 4.8 3.8 1.4 0.2 2.3 
Treatment unsuccessful 6.5 9.8 9.9 7.9 8.2 10.7 6.0 8.2 
Staff not welcoming 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.6 
Other 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 
 
All users  None (satisfied) 70.2 66.1 67.2 69.3 65.1 66.4 70.3 67.8 
Facilities were not clean 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 
Long waiting time 17.0 6.8 9.3 7.2 7.7 12.1 16.1 11.2 
No trained professionals 1.5 2.1 2.7 1.6 2.3 2.4 0.7 1.8 
Too expensive 7.5 17.3 15.2 17.2 18.6 12.3 6.6 13.1 
No drugs available 4.2 6.6 6.4 5.0 5.6 7.4 3.9 5.6 
Treatment unsuccessful 5.6 9.4 13.2 8.5 9.1 6.5 5.0 7.8 
Staff not welcoming 2.4 0.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.4 1.6 
Other 0.3 1.6 0.1 0.9 2.5 1.7 0.0 1.0 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
Note: * indicates less than 20 observations – these cells are likely not to be reliable but provided for 
completeness. 
 
 
After cost, the second main reason for non-satisfaction is long waiting time, again in 
virtually all countries. This was an issue for 11.5 percent of patients in Burundi, 11.2 
percent in Mali, 10.5 percent in Senegal, 8.2 percent in the Republic of Congo, and 3.9 
percent of patients in Ghana (in that country, the complaint ranks third after unsuccessful 
treatment). On this issue, FIIs do not seem to have a demonstrable comparative advantage 
versus public and private secular facilities. In some countries, complaints about long 
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waiting times are higher among faith-inspired facilities than among public facilities, but 
in other countries, the reverse is observed. As for the other reasons why some households 
declare being unsatisfied, sample sizes among faith-inspired facilities are often too small 
to be able to make a valid comparison with public facilities. 
 
What could explain the better performance of faith-inspired providers in terms of the 
satisfaction-cost relationship as compared to public facilities? One explanation could be 
that faith-inspired providers provide services at a lower cost to households – possibly 
through efforts to make care affordable for the poor. This is what is observed in the next 
chapter in this volume on the basis of qualitative work for Burkina Faso by Gemignani 
and Wodon (2012). But when this is the case, it must be that faith-based providers have 
ways to reduce their own operating costs or have access to other resources in order to be 
financially sustainable, given that they often benefit from smaller support from the state 
than is the case for public facilities. Another potential explanation often mentioned in the 
literature could be that patients are more satisfied with faith-inspired providers despite 
higher out-of-pocket costs, as discussed by Olivier and Wodon (2012). The evidence 
provided in the next section tends to suggest that both factors may be at work, and that 
the answer depends on the specific countries (and probably facilities) being considered.  
 
ESTIMATES OF OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS 
 
This section provides cross-country evidence on the cost of healthcare using multi-
purpose household surveys whose questionnaires include health modules with private 
cost data and distinguish between public, faith-inspired, and private secular providers.  
These are different surveys from those used in the previous section, so that it is difficult 
to compare the results between on actual out-of-pocket costs and the perceptions of costs 
discussed earlier. Still, the data provide valuable insights on out-of-pocket costs.   
 
Average out-of-pocket costs for households of consultations are provided by type of 
provider in table 6 for nine countries where that information is available. These are not 
the total costs paid by households – for example transport costs are not included, but 
these are the costs paid to health facilities for the services received. The main interest is 
again in the comparison of the cost of public and faith-inspired facilities, but the table 
also provides data on other providers of healthcare.   
 
The results are somewhat unexpected. In four countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Swaziland, 
and Zambia), consultation costs are similar between public and faith-inspired facilities, 
while one might have expected costs to be substantially higher in faith-inspired facilities 
because they tend to benefit only from limited support from the state. This is the case in 
three countries (Ghana, Malawi, and Nigeria) where public facilities are cheaper than 
faith-inspired facilities. But in Sierra Leone care provided in faith-inspired facilities tend 
to be substantially cheaper for households than publicly provided care.  Thus, the 
comparison of out-of-pocket costs tends to be country specific, and in addition, 
differences in costs between public and faith-inspired providers tend to be smaller on 
average than one might have expected given the fact that state funding for faith-inspired 
providers is often limited so that they need to find other ways to achieve cost recovery.   
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It should be emphasized however that these broad comparisons of costs are provided 
across all types of facilities, and across all types of care seeking consultations, and this 
may affect comparisons. For example, in Ghana most faith-inspired providers are 
associated with the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG), and the role of 
hospitals in CHAG is larger in relative terms than the role of hospitals in public facilities. 
The fact that hospitals tend to provide more intensive care that also tends to be more 
expensive could explain the differences in costs observed in table 6 whereby in that 
country, faith-inspired providers as a whole appear to be more costly than public 
providers. More detailed work could try to look at differences between providers 
according to the type of facility used by households (say, a clinic versus a hospital), but 
unfortunately, this is difficult to do in most countries because the sample size tends to be 
too small for such disaggregation (in many countries, the market share of faith-inspired 
providers is small, so that slicing the observations in the sample for those seeking care by 
type of facility tends to reduce the sample sizes too much for estimation). 
 
Note that the same caveat applies for cost comparisons with other providers, especially 
because that group tends to be highly heterogeneous (it would include private secular 
facilities-based care as well as chemical stores and pharmacists, for example).  Another 
issue that makes the comparison of out-of-pocket costs between providers difficult is the 
fact that insurances play a role – individuals who benefit from insurance and tend to be 
better off will typically use private secular providers more, but may have lower out-of-
pocket costs because of their insurance coverage. This then may hide the true cost of care 
in household surveys. In the next section, a more detailed analysis of costs for Ghana will 
be provided with controls. But what is clear from table 6, is that as expected, faith-
inspired tend to be at least as expensive as public providers, and this in turn is related to 
the fact that typically, faith-inspired providers receive only partial support from the state, 
so that they do need to request higher fees from households for cost recovery even when 
they benefit from a cost advantage if they can rely on dedicated staffs who may be 
willing to work for lower wages due to their desire to serve the poor. 
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Table 6: Cost of Healthcare Consultation, Local Currencies 
  Residence Area Welfare quintile National 
 
Urban Rural Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 
Burundi, 2006 
 Public 861 230 175 160 114 118 593 244 
Faith-inspired 653 192 63 41 499 58 366 208 
Private secular 1558 337 137 120 351 439 879 455 
Total 1164 243 155 137 203 170 622 277 
 
Cameroon, 2007 
 Public 1113 492 344 486 592 773 1151 729 
Faith-inspired 937 658 531 678 687 852 963 774 
Private secular 841 233 96 228 321 547 960 459 
Total 979 410 266 397 494 702 1052 628 
 
Ghana, 2005/06 
 Public 9403 6866 4982 9567 7409 6292 9874 7902 
Faith-inspired 11965 9176 4587 5469 13394 8290 14762 10343 
Private secular 6600 2542 3210 1435 3510 4077 6574 4057 
Total 8272 4824 4123 5207 5904 5327 8616 6175 
 
Sierra Leone, 2003/04 
 Public 6266 2603 1359 1907 2541 3386 6481 4058 
Faith-inspired 3529 2183 1141 1184 2552 2175 4911 2597 
Private secular 7873 2208 1820 906 2479 4363 8548 5368 
Total 6824 2465 1447 1515 2520 3593 7207 4407 
 
Swaziland, 2009/10 (total medical bill) 
 Public 71 35 22 22 29 36 84 40 
Faith-inspired 76 48 18 36 36 41 101 52 
Private secular 765 270 43 448 146 822 349 419 
Total 312 73 22 64 50 180 172 112 
 
Zambia, 2004 
 Public 5205 1841 1604 2121 2467 3347 4298 2937 
Faith-inspired 7229 2667 2519 2082 2503 4292 4363 3244 
Private secular 8214 3379 2602 3136 4771 3891 8893 5242 
Total 6584 2459 2010 2513 3291 3620 6269 3847 
 
Malawi, 2004 
 Public 109 18 10 9 20 27 68 27 
Faith-inspired 714 226 110 153 177 217 410 244 
Private secular 154 26 11 17 22 44 74 36 
Total 144 31 13 18 27 46 90 40 
 
Nigeria 2003/04 
 Public 529 506 185 191 284 401 937 516 
Faith-inspired 1608 575 163 232 167 941 1478 997 
Private secular 676 601 124 303 332 521 979 633 
Total 621 553 156 244 303 464 973 582 
Source: Authors’ estimations using household surveys.  
 
 
REDUCING COSTS FOR HOUSEHOLDS: A BRIEF CASE STUDY 
 
It was mentioned in the previous section that Ghana is one of the countries in table 6 
where out-of-pocket costs for faith-inspired providers tend to be higher than for public 
providers. In this section, more details are provided on Ghana’s health system to suggest 
why this may have been the case at the time the household survey data used in table 6 
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were collected (in 2005-06 for that country), but also why this may be changing due to 
efforts in the national health policy to reduce out-of-pocket costs for households.   
 
At independence, Ghana inherited a publicly funded health system that comprised mostly 
of government-owned health care service delivery. User fees were abolished making 
health care theoretically free. But facing economic contractions and shortfalls in funding 
for the health system, public health care facilities began charging user fees for services, 
as did faith-inspired facilities which in the absence of public subsidies could also rely on 
donations from foreign missions. While cost recovery was justified as a means to 
encourage greater accountability of health care providers while increasing facility-level 
autonomy over use of internally generated funds, user fees created barriers to accessing 
health care in the absence of appropriate risk pooling mechanisms in place. Concurrent 
with the formalization of user fees, a policy to exempt the poor accompanied the system, 
at least for public facilities. But these exemptions failed to reach their target groups.  
 
Looking at health facilities in the Volta region, Nyonator and Kutzin (1999) found that 
exemptions were applied unevenly across health care facilities and income groups. They 
concluded that despite the policy to exempt ‘paupers’, the poor were either facing 
catastrophic health expenditures or were not seeking health care when needed. As a 
result, the poor continued to pay out-of-pocket for user fees at public (and faith-inspired) 
facilities. Out-of-pocket payments, the most regressive form of financing were the major 
source of funds for all facilities, whether public, faith-inspired, or private non-religious.  
 
At the time of the last National Health Accounts in 2002, out-of-pocket payments 
accounted for about half of total health expenditures. Under these circumstances the 
evidence on whether faith-inspired facilities were able to subsidize services for the poor 
and be less costly than other facilities was mixed. For example, Asenso-Okyere (1995) 
suggested that “since the quality of service is high, users are willing to pay for it. The 
poor who cannot pay the fees are exempted. Exemption can pose identification problems 
but since the missions operate mostly in the rural areas where people know each other it 
is usually not too difficult for a social worker to recognize the needy.” By contrast 
Nyonator and Kutzin (1999) suggested that facilities “insist on the payment of 
deposits…for inpatient services, especially in mission hospitals. While it is fair to say that 
deposits help to promote cost recovery, they also pose a serious threat to accessibility.”  
 
There have been however important changes in recent years in health service delivery in 
Ghana, so that what may have been observed in the past is not necessarily still relevant 
today. First, in comparison with other countries, CHAG has experienced an active 
collaborative relationship with the Ghanaian government. A Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed in 2003 between CHAG and the Ministry of Health, which has 
helped provide more state funding to CHAG facilities, especially for salaries. As of 2005 
the government provided between 45 percent and 60 percent of CHAG’s total operating 
revenues (CHAG 2006), and this may have increased further since. About 80 percent of 
this was for the salaries of about 7,000 CHAG health staffs. Thus in contrast to the time 
when CHAG facilities operated as mission organizations, they now obtain most of their 
revenues from government funding for salary costs and from the services they provide. 
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In addition, in an effort to remove user fees, provide protection against catastrophic 
health expenditures, and improve equity and access to care, Ghana created in 2003 the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The NHIS relies on a combination of 
earmarked tax revenues and income-based premium contributions to substitute for user 
fees. In this system, the funding follows the patient. Health care providers are reimbursed 
by the NHIS for services and drugs covered in the benefits package that are provided to 
NHIS members. The NHIS exempts vulnerable groups such as the indigent, the elderly, 
and children of enrolled members from paying premiums. The premium contribution 
levels are also income-based in order to reduce the burden on the poor. While the 
legislative instrument guiding the NHIS did set a narrow definition of the indigent 
category as a group with no identifiable source of income or shelter and fixed the 
percentage of enrolled members that qualify as indigent at 2.5 percent of those enrolled 
(versus a share of the population in poverty of 28.6 percent), the policy still has helped.  
 
According to data from the NHIS website, as of June 2009 some 13.8 million individuals 
were registered in the scheme, representing close to 60 percent of the population. The 
program is managed by District Mutual Health Schemes, but in addition to members 
participating through district schemes, workers contributing to the Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust are also enrolled. On the provider side, public facilities are 
automatically accredited to participate, but in addition the NHIS has provisionally 
accredited 1,551 private healthcare facilities, including 400 hospitals and clinics, 237 
maternity homes, 451 pharmacies, 329 licensed chemical shops and 128 diagnostic 
facilities (laboratories and diagnostic imaging facilities). Most of the CHAG facilities 
have been accredited. Makinen et al (2011) assess that CHAG currently has the highest 
share of NHIS-covered patients (73 percent), compared with public providers (69 
percent) and self-financed private providers (56 percent). Overall, exempt groups, which 
do not have to pay to be part of the scheme, accounted for close to 70 percent of all 
registered members. By contrast, the estimations presented in table 6 were obtained with 
the GLSS5, which dates back to 2005-06, a time at which only a small share of the 
population has registered with the NHIS1. Thus the situation has probably improved. 
 
According to CHAG management, the NHIS has facilitated payments to CHAG member 
facilities for the services they provide and this is perceived by these facilities as a major 
improvement which may have further aligned the cost of care among FIIs and public 
facilities. Some issues may remain. For example, Ballou-Aares et al (2008) note that the 
rapid scale up of the NHIS has put a burden on claims processing. Administrators of 
CHAG facilities interviewed by Shojo et al (2012) cite delays in receiving funds, which 
affects their cash flow. As the Director of a CHAG hospital explained: “the idea of the 
NHIS is perfect. It is good for the poor and brings clinics to a certain standard. But 
delivery has some problem. Our workload increased. It put stress on our finance because 
payment does not come regularly.” Shojo et al (2012) also suggest that FIIs continue to 
                                                                        
1 Prior to the NHIS, some mission hospitals had actually instituted their own insurance schemes (e.g., the community 
insurance plan around St. Theresa’s Hospital in the Brong Ahafo Region) and this experience helped inform the 
introduction of the NHIS. 
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suffer from a lack of resources including medicines and technical equipment, with the 
situation more severe for facilities not yet accredited with the NHIS. Nevertheless, the 
need to rely heavily on out-of-pocket costs from patients to achieve cost recovery in 
faith-inspired facilities has greatly been reduced with the introduction of the NHIS and 
the memorandum of understanding signed between CHAG and the Ministry of Health, 
which shows how health reforms may work towards achieving more equity in financing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Faith-inspired providers often aim to serve all – and many also have a commitment to 
serve the poor and vulnerable. However, the extent to which they are actually able to do 
so (given their resources) remains an open question. Even if FIIs do benefit from staff 
that are dedicated, some of whom may be able and willing to work for very low pay, 
running a health facility does cost money, and financial sustainability requires funding. 
When faith-inspired facilities do not benefit from state support, or when they benefit from 
lower levels of state support than public facilities, they often need to rely on cost 
recovery from patients and students to break even. When a higher level of cost recovery 
is required from users, it is more difficult for faith-inspired facilities to serve the poor, 
because the cost of their services becomes less affordable for those in need.   
 
In this context, two questions were asked in this paper. First, is the cost of healthcare a 
major reason for not being satisfied with health services and does this differ between 
types of providers? Second, what is the out-of-pocket cost of healthcare for households? 
Overall, the results suggest that cost does remain a major concern for many households 
and that there are some differences in out-of-pocket costs between providers. Yet at the 
same time, these cost differences tend not to be as large as one might have assumed, and 
health sector reforms can help in reducing both these differences and out-of-pocket costs. 
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